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INTERNATIONAL INVESTORS' RIGHTS
AND REMEDIES IN THE
ADJUDICATION OF DISPUTES WITH
U.S. SECURITIES AND COMMODITIES
FIRMS IN THE CONTEXT OF U.S.
ARBITRAL FORUM SELECTION"
Madelaine Eppenstein*
I. INTRODUCTION
The globalization of markets, the internationalization,
merger and consolidation of major investment firms, the join-
der of commercial and investment banking and the interest of
international public investors in utilizing the services of repu-
table, brand-name brokers, has contributed to a concomitant
increase in customer claims filed in arbitration by both domes-
tic and international investors.' Yet, in practice, very few de-
frauded international investors who do business with United
t Copyright © 2002 Madelaine Eppenstein, New York, N.Y. Portions of
this Article in substantially modified form were originally published by the
author in International Investors' Rights and Remedies in Regard to Fraudu-
lent Investment Activities by U.S. Securities and Commodities Firms, [Jan.-
Dec.] 5 World Sec. L. Rep. (BNA), at 39 (May 1999).
* Madelaine Eppenstein is a partner in the New York office of Eppen-
stein and Eppenstein, a firm specializing in litigation, arbitration and media-
tion of investor rights that represented the investors in the landmark United
States Supreme Court case Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon,
482 U.S. 220 (1987), cited in this Article. During 1978-79, she served as Ex-
ecutive Editor of the Brooklyn Journal of International Law, and co-authored
the Note Radio Propaganda in the Contexts of International Regulation and
the Free Flow of Information as a Human Right, 5 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 154
(1979). The author was a member of Brooklyn Law School's winning Philip
C. Jessup International Law Moot Court Competition team in 1978, when she
also served as a Member of the Journal.
1 See discussion infra note 18. Some of the increase in volume of case
filings in 2001 was attributable to the bear market tech stock crash that be-
gan in the spring of 2000. See Richard Karp, Disputed Calls: A Year After
Nasdaq's Peak, Arbitration Claims Against Brokers Soar, BARRON'S, May 21,
2001, at 21.
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States securities and commodity futures firms through branch
offices based both outside of and within the U.S., appear to be
aware of their rights and remedies. Those who are savvy
enough to discern that their boilerplate customer agreement
with a securities broker-dealer or a commodities futures com-
mission merchant ("FCM") usually requires adjudication of all
claims in a U.S. based arbitral institution or reparations tribu-
nal do not always, in the first instance, seek the advice of ex-
perienced U.S. counsel. Typically they will contact a member
of this specialized bar in the U.S. only after first consulting
their local counsel. Unless previously initiated to this area of
practice, foreign counsel may advise their clients of potential
claims in their own locality, but may be unaware of the inves-
tor's ability, if not the clear mandate under the broker's ac-
count-opening documentation, to obtain recovery through arbi-
tration in the U.S.2 Though international claimants may not
2. Under the Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement
of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, "[tihe validity and enforce-
ability of [alternative dispute resolution] clauses may be controversial, par-
ticularly if they contradict principles of consumer protection established by
the Brussels Convention. Contract terms that deprive a consumer of the
right to initiate legal proceedings in the Contract States where the consumer
is domiciled are not likely to be enforced." Karol K. Deniston, Do Pre-Dispute
Arbitration Agreements Violate Core Principles?, Paper Presented at the
American Bar Association Section of Dispute Resolution Annual Conference
(Apr. 27, 2001) (on file with Journal). See also Brussels Convention on Juris-
diction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters,
arts. 2, 5, & 17, 1968 O.J. (C 27) 1, 4, 5, 8-9.
Another wrinkle suggested by Deniston may be presented by Article 7
of the Hague Conference on Private International Law, which currently pro-
vides that consumers can sue and be sued in the country where they are
domiciled and can agree to the venue where a dispute will be adjudicated, but
only if "such agreement is entered into after the dispute has arisen." Hague
Conference on Private International Law, Preliminary Draft Convention on
Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, at
http://www.hcch.net/e/workprog/jdgm.html (Oct. 30, 1999); see also Deniston,
supra note 2. Thus, as a general matter, typical U.S. broker-dealer pre-
dispute arbitration agreements, which prospectively waive access to the
courts, may not be binding against the investor in the European Union. How-
ever, they are enforceable against the broker-dealer at the discretion of the
international securities or commodity futures customer under applicable
rules of U.S. self-regulatory organizations, based on the contract or the mem-
bership of the brokerage firm at the organization. See discussion infra note
12. Therefore, the practical applicability of these international norms in the
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be fully cognizant of the available legal rights and remedies,
many intuitively recognize that, as the financial center of the
U.S. and a global center for finance, as well as the site of the
New York Stock Exchange, Inc. ("NYSE"), and the Nasdaq
Stock Market, Inc. ("Nasdaq"), New York is the logical starting
point to obtain legal advice.3
International customers who bring their claims under the
auspices of the major self-regulatory organizations ("SROs")
that run arbitration programs, such as the NYSE and the Na-
tional Association of Securities Dealers Dispute Resolution,
Inc. ("NASD-DR), usually elect to have their disputes adjudi-
cated in the U.S.4 New York City continues to be a magnet for
context of regulated industries, such as the securities industry, may be a
moot point.
3. See Carole Silver, Globalization and the U.S. Market in Legal Ser-
vices-Shifting Identities, 31 LAW & POLY INT'L Bus. 1093, 1135-36 (2000).
The Nasdaq Stock Market, Inc., is currently an affiliate of the National Asso-
ciation of Securities Dealers, Inc., but is in the "process of becoming inde-
pendent from the [National Association of Securities Dealers]" as part of a
restructuring of the two companies, which will result in Nasdaq becoming an
independent national securities exchange. Nasdaq Separates Further From
NASD by Completing Share Repurchase, 34 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No.
11, at 426 (Mar. 18, 2002).
4. In only limited circumstances in a few locales will the SROs provide
overseas venues. See, e.g., Memorandum No. 98-42 from the New York Stock
Exchange, to Members and Member Organizations (Dec. 15, 1998), at
http'//www.nyse.com/regulation/regulation.html. The memo states:
In recognition that our members and member organizations are
expanding their businesses outside of the United States and increas-
ingly offering their services to public non-institutional customers
overseas, the Exchange will, where warranted by due process and
fairness considerations, convene arbitration panels in London and
Tokyo. Decisions on venue overseas will be made using the same cri-
teria used domestically. Establishing these new hearing locations
will accommodate non-U.S. customers of members or member or-
ganizations in Europe and Asia who wish to avail themselves of the
Exchange's arbitration facilities. In further recognition of this global
expansion, members and member organizations doing business with
public non-institutional customers outside of the United States, par-
ticularly in non-English speaking countries, must insure that the
disclosures required by Rule 636 are communicated in a language in
which the customer is fluent. Members and member organizations
with public non-institutional customers outside the United States,
particularly those doing business in non-English speaking countries,
must conduct their own internal review of their accounts to insure
20021 445
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arbitration cases in general, as reflected in filing percentages.5
International investors who avail themselves of the advantages
of U.S. based venue and counsel come from widely diverse eco-
nomic backgrounds and geographic locations. In the author's
practice, some of those who have successfully adjudicated dis-
putes, through arbitration and mediation at the NYSE and
NASD-DR, have included: a distant relation of a European
royal family; an industrialist from Germany who was a major-
ity shareholder in a company that conducted billions of dollars
of global business a year; an international distributor of candy
and confections from France; a dentist from Italy; representa-
tives of a large Indonesian textile company; an investment
company in Cyprus; a private investor from the Middle East;
and a retired furniture manufacturer from Belgium. A com-
mon thread was that all of the investors brought claims of al-
leged wrongdoing in the business conduct of the overseas
branch offices of large U.S. firms.'
that their Customer Account Agreements are in compliance with the
required disclosure of the Arbitration Rules.
Id.
5. See discussion infra note 18. However, a breakdown of filings by do-
mestic versus international claimants was not available from sources at the
NYSE and NASD-DR. Generally, New York City venued cases account for
30-40% of the NYSE caseload. E-mail from Robert S. Clemente, Director of
Arbitration, New York Stock Exchange, to Madelaine Eppenstein (Mar. 18,
2002) (on file with Journal). At NASD-DR, Northeast Region (comprised of
offices across the Northeastern and Mid-Atlantic states, New York, Boston,
Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, Albany, Buffalo, Baltimore, Norfolk and Richmond,
as well as Washington, D.C.) venued cases were approximately 35% of their
caseload, with cases centered in New York City comprising 18.3% of the en-
tire region's caseload. Telephone Interview with Elizabeth R. Clancy, Associ-
ate Vice President and Regional Director Northeast Region, National Asso-
ciation of Security Dealers Dispute Resolution (Mar. 19, 2002).
6. Each of these cases was settled during arbitration hearings or in me-
diation prior to the rendering of an arbitral award, with only one exception, a
case that was on trial at the time this Article was written. As a result, the
filings of these cases at an arbitral institution is not reflected in the database
of the SROs awards. For a primary database online, NASD-DR works in
conjunction with a service operated jointly by the Commerce Clearing House,
Inc., securities and commodities law publisher, in partnership with the
Securities Arbitration Commentator, Inc., a publication and database service
based in Maplewood, New Jersey, as a way of providing a comprehensive,
current, and publicly available database of annotated awards issued by a
number of active forums such as NASD-DR, the NYSE, and the independent
American Arbitration Association. See NASD Dispute Resolution, at
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In each case, the international customer, and in almost all
cases their local counsel, were unaware or unsure whether im-
proper or fraudulent activity had caused the investment loss.
Unfortunately, this phenomenon is widespread. It is also ex-
perienced by domestic public investors and has been reported
often in U.S. court cases involving misrepresentation and con-
cealed fraud. In the prosecution of the public customer cases
mentioned above, it was only through diligent investigation
and discovery, using procedural techniques developed through
litigation in U.S. courts and at the SROs, that the nature of the
wrongful conduct became apparent! Each of these interna-
tional claimants recovered sizable amounts running into mil-
lions of dollars on average, sometimes well in excess of their
out of pocket losses, through settlements achieved during or
after the arbitration hearings (and before award), or in media-
tion.
While mediation may not have been widely employed in
Europe until the end of the last century, except perhaps in the
United Kingdom and Germany, "[airbitration has long been an
accepted and even preferred method for solving international
disputes."9 In practice, therefore, the potential claimant from
http'/www.nasdadr.com (last visited Mar. 6, 2002); Securities Arbitration
Commentator, at http'/www.sacarbitration.com (last visited Mar. 6, 2002).
7. See, e.g., Fujisawa Pharm. Co. v. Kapoor, 115 F.3d 1332, 1335 (7th Cir.
1997); Law v. Medco Research, Inc., 113 F.3d 781, 786 (7th Cir. 1997); Marks
v. CDW Computer Ctr., Inc., 122 F.3d 363, 367-69 (7th Cir. 1997); Nat. Rural
Elec. Coop. Assoc. v. Breen Capital Serv. Corp., No. 00-722, 2001 WL 294086
(D.N.J. Mar. 28, 2001); Rotter v. Leahy, 93 F. Supp. 2d 487, 500-01 (S.D.N.Y.
2000); Dietrich v. Bauer, 76 F. Supp. 2d 312, 345 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); Morin v.
Trupin, 809 F. Supp. 1081, 1097 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); Patsos v. First Albany
Corp., 741 N.E.2d 841 (Mass. 2001). Frequently in such cases, the courts
have held that the concealed fraud and misrepresentation effectively pre-
vented the plaintiff from being put on inquiry notice of the wrongdoing, which
sometimes operates to toll the applicable statutes of limitations.
8. These procedural techniques include, but are not limited to: (1) so-
phisticated, database driven investigation of the rogue broker and the firm;
(2) tracking down prior cases brought against the broker and the firm; (3)
aggressively pursuing pre-hearing information and discovery requests and in-
person pre-hearing conferences; and (4) early retention and involvement of
the claimant's expert witness in initial client interviews and in rigorous
analysis of account opening documents, the trading history and available
records.
9. Center for Public Resources, Online Seminar, European ADR 2000:
European ADR Practice, Issues and Trends (Jan. 10-16, 2000), available at
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overseas may readily appreciate that arbitration of securities
and commodities ° disputes is a viable, highly appropriate fo-
rum for the resolution of their claims.
This Article will focus on the practical considerations of po-
tential claims and remedies available to the international cus-
tomer in disputes arising against overseas offices of major U.S.
broker-dealers and FCMs. Part II will provide the historical
context in which the United States Supreme Court has man-
dated that claims arising under the U.S. securities laws are
almost always subject to compulsory arbitration at the various
arbitral self-regulatory organizations, where record filings by
customers occurred in 2001." As demonstrated in Part III, un-
der the commodities laws, however, there may be additional
options, including court litigation and reparations. In either
case, the international investor may seek the protection of both
statutory and common law remedies in the U.S. to gain redress
for fraudulent activity. Part IV addresses some recurrent sce-
narios that have given rise to various theories of liability for
fraudulent conduct by a broker, and briefly touches on some
common procedural considerations that may differ from sys-
WL 18 ALTHCL 43. Arbitration as a method of resolving disputes that arise
in international trade has a long history, and is conducted primarily in the
context of model laws enacted over the years to establish uniform standards
for the settlement of international commercial disputes. See generally
Vivienne M. Ashman, UNCITRAL Initiatives to Further Harmonize and
Modernize Arbitration Laws, Rules and Practices, in INTERNATIONAL
BUSINESS LITIGATION & ARBITRATION 2000, at 635 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Prac-
tice Course, Handbook Series No. 624, 2000) (citing Convention on the Rec-
ognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, 21
U.S.T. 2518, 330 U.N.T.S. 38).
10. The commodity regulations require that public customers be given
several options for filing claims, either in court, arbitration or before a repa-
rations tribunal administered by the regulatory body that oversees the com-
modities markets, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission. See Com-
modity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-27 (2000) [hereinafter CEA]. See gener-
ally discussion infra Part III; PHILIP MCBRIDE JOHNSON & THOMAS LEE
HAZEN, COMMODITIES REGULATION (2d ed. 1989); PHILIP MCBRIDE JOHNSON &
THOMAS LEE HAZEN, COMMODITIES REGULATION (3d ed. 1998); PHILIP MCBRIDE
JOHNSON & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, SPECIAL SUPPLEMENT: OVERVIEW OF THE
COMMODITY FUTURES MODERNIZATION ACT OF 2000 (3d ed. 2002).
11. See note 18 infra. For a general review of a wide range of topics cover-
ing the field of securities disputes, see Constantine N. Katsoris, The Resolu-
tion of Securities Disputes, 6 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 307 (2001) [herein-
after The Resolution of Securities Disputes].
448 [Vol. XXVII:2
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tems of justice abroad. Concerns that are often expressed by
the international investor when seeking to pursue claims in the
U.S. are addressed in Part V. But while these investors will
likely face a number of fairly typical procedural and tactical
issues, such as defenses based on statutes of limitations and so-
called eligibility or timeliness rules at the SROs, along with
preemptive, affirmative defenses and counterclaims asserted
by the broker, the international investor ultimately has the
opportunity to obtain a highly favorable recovery in an Ameri-
can court, arbitration or reparations proceeding.
II. CLAIMS FOR SECURITIES FRAUD AND RELATED CAUSES
OF ACTION ARE CUSTOMARILY SUBJECT TO COMPULSORY
ARBITRATION UNDER U.S. LAw
Until 1987, defrauded investors could choose to go to court
and have a judge and jury decide their federal statutory claims
under the U.S. securities laws. In the likely event that the
defendant broker-dealer was a member of an SRO, such as the
NYSE or the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc.,
("NASD"), claims in arbitration could be asserted upon the de-
mand of the public customer, and access to the arbitral forum
could be based on the membership provisions of those organiza-
tions even in the absence of an arbitration agreement. 2 Over-
12. Access to SRO arbitration based on membership of the respondent is
still the rule. See N.Y. STOCK EXCH., art. XI, 2 N.Y. Stock Exch. Guide (CCH)
1501; N.Y. STOCK EXCH. R. 600(a), 2 N.Y. Stock Exch. Guide (CCH) 2600.
Arbitration Rule 600(a) states:
Any dispute, claim or controversy between a customer or non-
member and a member, allied member, member organization and/or
associated person arising in connection with the business of such
member, allied member, member organization and/or associated per-
son in connection with his activities as an associated person shall be
arbitrated under the Constitution and Rules of the New York Stock
Exchange, Inc. as provided by any duly executed and enforceable
written agreement or upon the demand of the customer or non-
member.
Id. at R. 600(a). The NASD-DR provides similarly as follows:
Any dispute, claim, or controversy eligible for submission under
the Rule 10100 Series between a customer and a member and/or as-
sociated person arising in connection with the business of such
2002] 449
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whelmingly though, the choice for public customers was to go to
court. But choice of forum was abrogated in 1987 by the Su-
preme Court in the seminal case of Shearson /American Ex-
press, Inc. v. McMahon.13 In that case, in which the author's
firm represented the investors, the Supreme Court, by a close
5-4 vote, enforced the arbitration clause in a customer agree-
member or in connection with the activities of such associated per-
sons shall be arbitrated under this Code, as provided by any duly
executed and enforceable written agreement or upon the demand of
the customer.
NAT'L ASS'N OF SEC. DEALERS DISPUTE RESOLUTION, CODE OF ARBITRATION
PROCEDURE R. 10301(a) (2001) [hereinafter NASD-DR ARBITRATION
CODE].
13. 482 U.S. 220 (1987). McMahon was a dispute arising under the Secu-
rities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78mm (2000) [hereinafter 1934
Act]. Two years after deciding McMahon, in Rodriguez De Quijas et al. v.
Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989), the Court also rele-
gated to arbitration claims arising under the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 77a-77bbbb (2000) [hereinafter 1933 Act]. It is thus ironic that, in an area
of virtually mandatory arbitration:
Securities disputes also generate a far higher proportion of judicial
proceedings relating to arbitrability and interlocutory appeals than
construction or other common types of arbitration .... Securities
cases tend to dominate the case law of arbitration .... [Tihe law of
arbitration is being formed in the crucible of disputes between secu-
rities brokers and their customers.
Stephen K. Huber & E. Wendy Trachte-Huber, Top Ten Developments in
Arbitration in the 1990s, 55 DISp. RESOL. J. 24, 34 (2001).
This phenomenon is not entirely inconsistent with the prediction,
made by the late Justice Harry A. Blackmun, in his dissent in McMahon,
that investors would be inclined to bring complaints in court regarding the
results of mandatory arbitration. 482 U.S. at 267-68 ("[Ilnvestors will be in-
clined, more than ever, to bring complaints to federal courts that arbitrators
were partial or acted in 'manifest disregard' of the securities laws.") (citation
omitted). If anything, for a time during the decade following McMahon, it
was the industry that took the lead in resorting to the courts in an attempt to
get judges, and not arbitrators, to micro-manage the arbitration process. See,
e.g., Peter Blackman, No Clear Winner Yet: Brokerage Firms Seek to Derail
Arbitration Effort, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 3, 1994, at 5. But see Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Driessens, N.Y. L.J., Oct. 24, 1996, at 27
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Oct. 23, 1996). For a critical overview of the fallout in the arbi-
tration process and the courts following the McMahon decision, see Constan-
tine N. Katsoris, The Betrayal of McMahon, 24 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 221
(1997); Constantine N. Katsoris, Riding the Trojan Horse Back to Wilko?, 10
SEC. ARB. COMMENTATOR 1 (1999).
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ment pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA7), 14 despite
historical aversion by both the courts" and the Securities and
Exchange Commission ("SEC") to the arbitration of securities
fraud disputes. 6 Since then, the caseload in arbitration has
steadily increased. In 2000, for example, there were approxi-
14. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-307 (2000).
15. Prior to McMahon, every circuit court but two had adhered to a long-
settled rule that pre-dispute arbitration agreements were unenforceable with
respect to claims asserted under the 1934 Act. See, e.g., Jacobson v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 797 F.2d 1197 (3d Cir. 1986); Mayaja,
Inc. v. Bodkin, 803 F.2d 157 (5th Cir. 1986); Conover v. Dean Witter Rey-
nolds, Inc., 794 F.2d 520 (9th Cir. 1986); Wolfe v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 800 F.2d
1032 (11th Cir. 1986); Mansbach v. Prescott, Ball & Turben, 598 F.2d 1017
(6th Cir. 1979); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Moore, 590 F.
2d 823 (10th Cir. 1978); Weissbuch v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc., 558 F.2d 831 (7th Cir. 1977).
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth and District of Columbia Circuits
had not appeared to have ruled per se on the question prior to McMahon. See
King v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., 796 F.2d 59 (5th Cir. 1986); Miller v.
Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., 791 F.2d 850 (11th Cir. 1986); Tashea v.
Bache, Halsey, Stuart, Shields, Inc., 802 F.2d 1337 (11th Cir. 1986); DeLan-
cie v. Birr, Wilson & Co., 648 F.2d 1255 (9th Cir. 1981); Ayres v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 538 F.2d 532 (3d Cir. 1976); Sibley v.
Tandy Corp., 543 F.2d 540 (5th Cir. 1976). Included in this list is the decision
of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in favor of the investors below
in McMahon, styled McMahon v. Shearson /American Express, Inc., 788 F.2d
94 (2d Cir. 1986). The two exceptions were in the Court of Appeals for the
First and Eighth Circuits. See, e.g., Page v. Moseley, Hallgarten, Estabrook &
Weeden, Inc., 806 F.2d 291 (1st Cir. 1986); Phillips v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, 795 F.2d 1393 (8th Cir. 1986).
16. The stinging dissent of Justice Blackmun observed the contradiction
in the SEC's support of the industry as an amicus in McMahon:
[U]ntil it filed an amicus brief in this case, the Commission consis-
tently took the position that [section] 10(b) claims, like those under
[section] 12(2), should not be sent to arbitration, that predispute ar-
bitration agreements, where the investor was not advised of his right
to a judicial forum, were misleading, and that the very regulatory
oversight upon which the Commission now relies could not alone
make securities industry arbitration adequate.
482 U.S. at 262. See also Exchange Act Release No. 19,813, [1982-1983
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 83,356, at 85,967 n.6 (May 26,
1983); Exchange Act Release No. 15,984, [1979 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 82,122, at 81,977-78 (July 2, 1979).
17. The steady rise in filings in customer arbitrations has historically
been punctuated by peaks and valleys as a result of market driven or other
forces, for example, the increase in filings following McMahon, which swept
20021 451
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mately 5,725 cases filed at the NASD, with a record 7,088 new
claims filed in 2001.8 The NYSE, which historically has main-
tained a smaller caseload, had 780 filings in 2001.'"
Arbitration generally at the NYSE and the NASD improved
significantly after 1987 for the public customer, becoming more
user-friendly. The Securities Industry Conference on Arbitra-
tion ("SICA"), "formed in 1977 to develop uniform rules govern-
ing the arbitration of disputes between broker-dealers and cus-
tomers at [SROs]," and now comprised of three members of the
public, representatives of seven SROs (including the NYSE and
NASD-DR), and one voting representative of the Securities In-
dustry Association ("SIA"), was responsible for preparing and
adopting a Uniform Code of Arbitration ("Uniform Code") and
making recommendations to improve the arbitration system at
the SROs in a continuing process of review and evaluation of
the operation of the Uniform Code and SRO arbitration."0 The
securities fraud cases under section 10b-5 of the 1934 Act into arbitration,
the surge following the precipitous market break commonly known as "Black
Monday" (Oct. 19, 1987), and the fall off in filings after the "crash" cases were
resolved. See SEC. INDUS. CONFERENCE ON ARBITRATION, ELEVENTH REPORT OF
THE SECURITIES INDUSTRY CONFERENCE ON ARBITRATION 106-26 (2001), avail-
able at http://www.nasdadr.com/pdf-text/sica-report.pdf (last visited Mar. 6,
2002) [hereinafter ELEVENTH REPORT].
18. Press Release, National Association of Securities Dealers Dispute
Resolution, NASD Dispute Resolution Has Record Year (Jan. 22, 2002),
available at http://www.nasdadr.com/news/pr2002/drrelease_02_001.html
[hereinafter Press Release]. NASD-DR reported a 24% increase in filings in
2001 over the previous year's numbers, representing a record 2,137 claims
filed in only the first four months of 2001, validating the notion that the tech
stock decline in 2000 motivated the subsequent surge in customer com-
plaints. Robust filings in the fourth quarter of 2001 did not appear to be af-
fected by the tragic attacks on the World Trade Center in the heart of the
financial center of New York on September 11, 2001. For updated filings and
other statistics, see NASD Dispute Resolution, Dispute Resolution Statistics,
at http://www.nasdadr.comlstatistics.asp#grapha (last visited Mar. 5, 2002).
NASD-DR recorded 20% more cases submitted to arbitration in the first two
months of 2002 than the same period in 2001. Telephone Interview with
Richard P. Ryder, Editor in Chief, Securities Arbitration Commentator (Mar.
22, 2002).
19. Statistics available from the Director of Arbitration at the NYSE.
These claims include customer versus broker-dealer, broker-dealer versus
customer and broker-dealer/employee cases.
20. SEC. INDUS. CONFERENCE ON ARBITRATION, TENTH REPORT OF THE
SECURITIES INDUSTRY CONFERENCE ON ARBITRATION 1 (1998). See also Con-
stantine N. Katsoris, SICA: The First Twenty Years, 23 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
452 [Vol. XXVII:2
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advent of enhanced arbitrator selection methods, which provide
the parties with greater control of the process, clarification of
procedures (generally for the appointment of arbitrators), ini-
tiation of continuing arbitrator training programs, 21 expanded
discovery options and the translation of the Uniform Code into
plain English, 2 provide the parties with a greater understand-
ing and command of the process, providing them with greater
input in choosing the arbitrators who will hear and determine
their cases.' Liberalized rules facilitating the capture of in-
formation and document discovery well before the hearings on
the merits are conducted improve the fairness of the process.24
This is especially important in the case of the international
public customer, who usually does not possess documentary
483, 535-38 (1996). See generally Thomas J. Stipanowich, Contract and Con-
flict Management, 2001 WIS. L. REv. 831, 900 n.403 (2001).
21. Arbitrators are now required to undergo hours of training before they
can sit on an arbitration panel, and must attend refresher training sessions
to keep abreast of forum requirements and changes. See NAT'L ASSN OF SEC.
DEALERS DISPUTE RESOLUTION, ARBITRATOR RECRUITMENT BROCHURE (2000),
available at http/www.nasdadr.com/arb-brochurehtm.asp (last visited Mar.
5, 2002).
22. See ELEVENTH REPORT, supra note 17, at 5. The preface to The Arbi-
trator's Manual, compiled by SICA as a guide for arbitrators "designed to
supplement and explain the [Uniform Code]," notes that "[slignificant differ-
ences between the Uniform Code and the procedures of the SROs," require
arbitrators to "always consult the rules of the arbitration forum in which they
are serving." SEC. INDUS. CONFERENCE ON ARBITRATION, THE ARBITRATOR'S
MANUAL, pmbl. (2001), available at http'//www.nasdadr.com/sica-manual.asp
(last visited Mar. 6, 2002) [hereinafter ARBITRATOR'S MANUAL].
23. In cases where the damages alleged are over $50,000, NASD-DR Rule
10308(b)(1)(B) provides for three arbitrators to sit on a case. See NASD-DR
ARBITRATION CODE, R. 10308(b)(1)(B). NYSE Rule 607(a)(1) provides for a
panel of three arbitrators where the matter in controversy exceeds $10,000.
N.Y. STOCK EXCH. R. 607(a)(1), 2 N.Y. Stock Exch. Guide (CCH) 2607. The
method for selection of arbitrators is materially different at these two major
SRO arbitral institutions, can be a complicated process and is a subject be-
yond the scope of this Article. See Theodore G. Eppenstein & Madelaine Ep-
penstein, Y2K Arbitrator Investigation and Selection, Paper Presented to the
Public Investors Arbitration Bar Association Eighth Annual Conference (Oct.
20-22, 1999) (on file with Journal); Theodore G. Eppenstein & Madelaine
Eppenstein, How to Select Arbitrators in Securities Arbitration, in SEC. ARB.
1996, at 585 (PLI Corp. L. & Practice Course, Handbook Series No. B4-7147,
1996).
24. See NASD-DR ARBITRATION CODE, R. 10321; N.Y. STOCK EXCH. R. 619,
2 N.Y. Stock Exch. Guide (CCH) 2619.
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proof or information concerning witnesses to fraudulent trans-
actions and other wrongdoing, particularly when the latter
turn out to be internal employees of the broker-dealer or FCM
and their overseas affiliated companies.
III. CLAIMANTS HAVE A RANGE OF OPTIONS WHEN
PURSUING COMMODITY FUTURES CLAIMS
In the commodity futures area, investors typically use the
services of introducing brokers ("IBs") who often act as invest-
ment advisors and utilize the services of FCMs in order to place
orders in the commodity futures markets. The IBs are some-
times "guaranteed" by the FCMs pursuant to agreements en-
tered into between the two. Investments can also be placed
through associated persons of the FCM itself.' Fraud claims
against commodity futures personnel may be brought against
the FCM, the IB, their respective employees and Associate
members. The claims can be based on theories of primary li-
ability or aiding and abetting liability, as well as theories of
agency and respondeat superior.6
The IBs and FCMs also utilize customer agreements which
are unlike those used by their securities industry counterparts.
Pursuant to former Commodity Futures Trading Commission
("CFTC") Regulation section 180.3,27 and the parallel amended
section under the Commodity Futures Modernization Act of
2000 ("CFMA"),28 when an IB or FCM wishes to place a pre-
dispute arbitration clause in its agreement with its public cus-
tomer, in addition to the use of mandatory language, the cus-
tomer is given more choices by statute than are available under
the securities laws and regulations. To begin with, the pre-
25. See NAT'L FUTURES ASS'N, NATIONAL FUTURES ASSOCIATION MANUAL TT
5011, 8101 (2001), available at http://www.nfa.futures.org/compliance/ man-
ual/index.html (last visited Feb. 23, 2002).
26. CEA, 7 U.S.C. § 25 (2000) (affording a private right of action for viola-
tions of the CEA); 7 U.S.C. § 6b (prohibiting fraud, false reporting or decep-
tion); 7 U.S.C. § 13(c) (providing a private right of action for aiding and abet-
ting liability); 7 U.S.C. § 2(a)(1)(A) (imposing agency/respondeat superior
liability).
27. 17 C.F.R. § 180.3 (2001).
28. A New Regulatory Framework for Trading Facilities, Intermediaries,
and Clearing Organizations, 66 Fed. Reg. 14262 (proposed Mar. 9, 2001) (to
be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 166).
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dispute arbitration agreement must be accompanied by a sepa-
rate arbitration clause and signature line. If the customer re-
fuses to sign the separate arbitration clause, then the IB or
FCM must still honor the customer's wish to engage the IB or
FCM, who cannot turn down a customer for failure to execute
the pre-dispute arbitration clause.29 Compare this with the
typical securities industry account opening agreement involv-
ing credit with its customers, where, although pre-dispute lan-
guage has become virtually universal and recited in bold print
since McMahon, the broker-dealer can still insist that the in-
vestor sign the pre-dispute agreement as a pre-condition to
doing business with the firm: the securities broker-dealer may
refuse to accept the customer unless the customer agrees to the
entire agreement.30
There are as many as three fora to resolve commodity futures
disputes: court, arbitration or reparations proceedings. The
29. 17 C.F.R. §180.3.
30. The SEC determined in 1988, following a study by a Commission staff
of sixty-five broker-dealer firms that accounted for approximately 90% of all
customer trading accounts in the U.S., that 96% of the margin accounts, 95%
of the options accounts and 39% of the cash accounts at those firms at the
time of the study were subject to pre-dispute arbitration clauses. SEC Self-
Regulatory Organizations; Order Approving Proposed Rule Changes by the
New York Stock Exchange, Inc., National Association of Securities Dealers,
Inc., and the American Stock Exchange, Inc., Relating to the Arbitration
Process and the Use of Predispute Arbitration Clauses, Exchange Act Release
No. 26805, [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 84,414, at
80,111-3 (May 10, 1989). However, despite the adhesive nature of the cus-
tomer agreement, the SEC and the securities industry's primary SROs man-
dated in 1989 that the securities industry could no longer prevent public cus-
tomers from asserting claims by contractually precluding punitive damages,
shortening statutes of limitation, or otherwise cutting off statutorily man-
dated rights, as they had done previously. Id. The release further states:
This provision makes clear that the use of arbitration for the resolu-
tion of investor/broker-dealer disputes represents solely a choice of
arbitration as a means of dispute resolution. Agreements cannot be
used to curtail any rights that a party may otherwise have had in a
judicial forum. If punitive damages or attorneys fees would be
available under applicable law, then the agreement cannot limit par-
ties' rights to request them, nor arbitrators' rights to award them.
The agreements may not be used to shorten applicable statutes of
limitation, restrict the situs of an arbitration hearing contrary to
SRO rules, nor to limit SRO forums otherwise available to parties.
Id. at 80,113
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dispute resolution procedures offered under the Commodity
Exchange Act ("CEA") are meant to be voluntary.3' They give
the customer the right to forego arbitration and to file a claim
in reparations, which is an administrative hearing before a
U.S. administrative law judge.32 There is no jury trial in this
proceeding. The customer can file a claim in reparations di-
rectly, but is also given forty-five days in order to choose repa-
rations after demand by the IB or FCM to arbitrate under a
pre-dispute agreement, since the right to adjudication in repa-
rations cannot be waived.33 A potentially significant drawback
for the international public customer, however, is that under 17
C.F.R. § 12.13(b)(4)(A) of the rules governing reparations, a
nonresident of the U.S. must post a bond for double the amount
of the claim.
This does not mean that customers cannot arbitrate at the
National Futures Association ("NFA") against a member firm
where there is no pre-dispute agreement. Claims have been
prosecuted in arbitration at the NFA without a pre-dispute
clause based solely upon the membership of the 1B and FCM at
the NFA.34 The NFA has its own arbitration rules,35 and is a
registered futures association with oversight by the CFTC.
36
Commodity futures disputes can also be heard in arbitration at
other alternative dispute resolution institutions, as a matter of
contract law, if the organization is listed as an alternative fo-
rum in the pre-dispute arbitration agreement (or, as occurs
only occasionally, the parties agree to arbitrate in a post-
dispute agreement), and under the proposed CFMA rules. The
NYSE can also be a potential forum for commodities disputes
when the respondent is a member of that exchange. However,
although the NYSE's arbitration facility has been used success-
31. 17 C.F.R. § 180.3(a).
32. § 180.3(b)(3) ("The agreement may not require the customer to waive
the right to seek reparations under section 14 of the [CEA, 7 U.S.C. § 18] ...
."). See also 17 C.F.R. § 12 (for the rules relating to reparations); McGough v.
Bradford, 2000 CFTC Lexis 225 (C.F.T.C. Sept. 28, 2000).
33. § 180.3(b)(3).
34. NAT'L FUTURES ASS'N, CODE OF ARBITRATION 6017.1(a)(1)(i) (2001),
available at http://www.nfa.futures.org (last visited Mar. 6, 2002) [hereinafter
NFA CODE OF ARBITRATION]. This is similar to the rules in effect at the other
SROs. See also supra note 12.
35. NFA CODE OF ARBITRATION, 6011.
36. CEA, 7 U.S.C. § 21 (2000).
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fully for major futures cases, according to the Director of Arbi-
tration, relatively few of these have been filed at the NYSE."
Under similar circumstances involving membership, the
NASD-DR may also be an appropriate forum.38
Some FCMs, by design, omit the pre-dispute arbitration
clause in their contracts. In fact, one major firm utilizes a
clause which attempts to require customers, regardless of their
domicile, to litigate all claims in the unlikely venue of a court
sitting in Chicago. But NFA arbitral jurisdiction can be in-
voked by filing customer claims against members, despite such
onerous clauses requiring court litigation in a distant or other-
wise highly inconvenient venue. Where the customer is ade-
quately represented it is possible to negotiate alternatives in
such instances, and, for example, to obtain the mutual agree-
ment of the parties to arbitrate the dispute under the auspices
of an established futures arbitral institution such as the NFA.39
37. Telephone Interview with Robert S. Clemente, Director of Arbitration,
New York Stock Exchange (Mar. 7, 2002).
38. Under the proposed customer protection rules of the CFMA, claimants
who choose to file claims in arbitration must be provided with a list of forum
choices such as the contract market relating to the transactions at issue, a
registered futures association, such as the NFA and at least one other "quali-
fied" arbitral organization. A New Regulatory Framework for Trading Facili-
ties, Intermediaries, and Clearing Organizations, 66 Fed. Reg. 14262 (pro-
posed Mar. 9, 2001) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 166). The NYSE and
NASD-DR admittedly do not track the number of commodity futures cases
which may have been filed there. See supra note 18; N.Y. STOCK EXCH. RR.
600(c), 635, 2 N.Y. Stock Exch. Guide (CCH) 2600, 2635. Such statistics
were not available from the Directors of Arbitration. For court decisions and
rulings of the CFTC, see, e.g., Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH).
39. Section 180.3 of the C.F.R. provides that:
No futures commission merchant... shall enter into any agreement
or understanding with a customer in which the customer agrees,
prior to the time the claim or grievance arises, to submit such claim
or grievance to any settlement procedure except as follows: ... (3)
The agreement may not require the customer to waive the right to seek
reparations under section 14 of the [CEA] and part 12 of these regu-
lations.
17 C.F.R. § 180.3 (2000) (emphasis added). See also § 180.3-6 (mandated
disclosures of non-waiveability of the right to bring a reparation case). The
CFMA retains these protections under Section 2(a)(i) of the NFA CODE OF
ARBITRATION, in which a customer has the absolute right to demand arbitra-
tion of a dispute with a member of the NFA. NFA CODE OF ARBITRATION,
6017.1. In one instance, a consolidation of separate cases on behalf of thirteen
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IV. INTERNATIONAL INVESTORS ARE PROTECTED FROM AND
MAY SEEK REDRESS FOR FRAUDULENT ACTIVITY
For the most part, the purchase and sale of securities are
governed and regulated by the SEC4 pursuant to the Securities
Act of 1933 ("1933 Act")41 and the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 ("1934 Act").42 Both statutes have anti-fraud provisions,
primarily under section 12(2) of the 1933 Act, 3 and under Rule
10b-5 of the 1934 Act, section 10(b).44 Investors in the commod-
ity futures markets can also seek redress for damages as the
result of fraudulent activity under section 4(b) of the CEA.45
Except in rare instances, however, individual investors cannot
claimants, the parties entered into a stipulation that abrogated pre-dispute
agreements to litigate in court in favor of the post-dispute stipulation to arbi-
trate under the auspices of the NFA. See National Futures Association,
Background Affiliation Status Information Center, at http://www.nfa.fu-
tures.orgbsic/details.asp?nfaid=001975&name=REFCO+LLC (last visited
Mar. 5, 2002) (for arbitral awards).
The arbitration was also illustrative of the potential for complexity in
resolving such cases: hearings on the merits commenced in fall 1998 and the
case concluded with closing arguments in spring 2001; it involved the testi-
mony of fifty-nine witnesses during 104 days of hearings, comprising over
24,000 pages of transcripts, in which over 400 exhibits were entered into
evidence. Id. The arbitrators issued awards aggregating in total approxi-
mately $43 million in damages. Id. See also Peter A. McKay & Ruth Simon,
Group of Investors Gets Award of $43 Million, WALL ST. J., July 27, 2001, at
C1.
40. The caveat to this general rule is that, while the SEC technically may
have oversight authority over the arbitration process and rule changes
thereof at the industry SROs pursuant to section 19 of the 1934 Act, as a
practical matter, neither the SEC in the securities arena nor the CFTC in the
futures industry has the ability to recover the claims of most public investors.
1934 Act § 19, 15 U.S.C. § 78s (2000). The attenuated exception is for com-
modities investor appeals from decisions in reparations proceedings against
FCMs and other commodity professionals registered with the CFTC, which
are adjudicated by administrative law judges or a CFTC hearing officer. A
form of oversight may arise only because this process is administered by the
CFTC, and subject to CFTC and U.S. federal court appellate review. See
CEA, 7 U.S.C. § 18 (2000). See generally 13A JERRY W. MARKHAM,
COMMODITIES REGULATION: FRAUD, MANIPULATION & OTHER CLAIMS § 20.01
(2000).
41. 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77mm (2000).
42. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78bbbb.
43. 15 U.S.C. § 771(2).
44. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b).
45. 7 U.S.C. § 6b.
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rely on the SEC, the CFTC or the SROs to prosecute their
claims of fraud. Only through private civil court actions, arbi-
tration, or reparations proceedings can both international and
domestic customers seek compensation.
A. Theories of Liability
Claims against U.S. broker-dealers and FCMs, as well as
their agents and employees, can be asserted under various
theories of liability arising under statutory schemes and the
common law. These include: (1) illegal trading where profit-
able trades and trades generating losses are shifted in and out
of accounts of unsuspecting investors; (2) brokers who do not
have written power of attorney engaging in unauthorized trad-
ing; (3) misrepresentations and omissions of material facts
made by brokers in their recommendation of a purchase or sale;
(4) brokers who fail to disclose the risks involved in a purchase
or sale being recommended to the customer; and (5) market
manipulation, to name a few.46 Depending upon the facts, other
claims that may be asserted are: (1) claims of churning or ex-
cessive trading, which may include excessively high turnover in
the account and trading effectively controlled by the broker for
the purpose of generating commissions which are not in the
customer's best interest, among other indicia; (2) unsuitable
investments, which include investments recommended by a
broker which are not in accordance with the customer's stated
investment objectives or not in accordance with the customer's
financial condition or tolerance for risk; (3) breach of fiduciary
duty; (4) breach of contract; (5) negligence; (6) gross negligence;
(7) misrepresentation; and (8) in certain limited instances, vio-
lations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
Act ("RICO"),47 among others.48 Ancillary claims in support of
primary fraud causes of action may be asserted in some cases:
46. See generally MARKam, supra note 40, §§ 14-26; 3 ALLAN R.
BROMBERG & LEwIs D. LOWENFELS, BROMBERG AND LOWENFELS ON SECURITIES
FRAUD & COMMODITIES FRAUD § 8 (2d ed. 2001) [hereinafter 3 BROMBERG AND
LOWENFELS].
47. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. §§
1961-1968 (2000) [hereinafter RICO]. See generally JED S. RAKOFF, RICO:
CIVIL AND CRIMINAL LAW AND STRATEGY § 7.04[2] (2000).
48. See generally MARKHAM, supra note 40, §§ 14-26; 3 BROMBERG &
LOWENFELS, supra note 46.
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(1) for a firm's failure to properly supervise its salespersons; (2)
violation of industry rules and regulations; (3) technical record
keeping violations which may enable fraudulent activity; (4)
violation of the firm's own policies, rules and regulations; and
(5) failure to execute orders in a timely manner."
B. Procedural Considerations
As has been discussed previously, SRO arbitral institutions,
such as exist at the NYSE, the NASD-DR and the NFA,
administer their own rules of procedure and have great
latitude in running arbitration hearings. For example,
arbitrators are not technically required to follow the formal
rules of evidence." Thus, more testimony and documentary
proof may be accepted into the record than in formal court
proceedings. While the court system in the U.S. at both the
state and federal level allows for appellate review, there are
only limited grounds promulgated under the FAA, such as
corruption by the arbitrators, and a limited, judicially created
basis ("manifest disregard of the law") by which an arbitration
award can be vacated or modified in a court proceeding.5
49. See, e.g., In re GNP Commodities, Inc., [1992-1994 Transfer Binder]
Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 25,360, at 39,214 (C.F.T.C. 1992), affd, Moni-
eson v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, 996 F.2d 852 (7th Cir. 1993)
("[Flailing to place account numbers on order tickets does provide an oppor-
tunity to direct profitable fills to favored accounts, and [anti-fraud] section 4b
of the CEA prohibits this type of allocation of winning and losing trades.").
Under the securities laws and case law, there is virtually no private right of
action for violation of stock exchange or other industry rules. However, these
allegations are in practice almost always linked to viable primary claims such
as statutory fraud violations, breach of fiduciary duty, breach of contract and
negligence. See, e.g., 4 ALLAN R. BROMBERG & LEWIS D. LOWENFELS,
BROMBERG AND LOWENFELS ON SECURITIES FRAUD & COMMODITIES FRAUD §
15.06 (2d ed. 2001) [hereinafter 4 BROMBERG & LOWENFELS].
50. See, e.g., ARBITRATOR'S MANUAL, supra note 22, at 29.
51. The FAA provides that an award may be vacated:
(1) where the award was procured by corruption, fraud or undue
means.
(2) where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitra-
tors....
(3) where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to
postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to
hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy; or of any
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V. PROCEDURAL AND TACTICAL ISSUES FOR INTERNATIONAL
CLAIMANTS
Some of the idiosyncrasies of the rules of practice in the U.S.
may be unfamiliar to international claimants. Yet, invariably,
and almost intuitively, these clients nevertheless raise ques-
tions about defenses they may be subject to, such as statutes of
limitations, the potential duty to mitigate and the always popu-
lar defense based on the concept of "inquiry notice."
A. Statutes of Limitations and Eligibility Rules
Although both the CEA and the securities laws provide for
private rights of action for claims of fraud," there are material
differences in the statutes of limitations: two years from dis-
covery of the fraud under the CEA53 and one year from the
discovery of the fraud, but no more than three from the accrual
of the claim, under section 12(2) of the 1933 Act and section
10b of the 1934 Act.54 There is generally an outside limit on the
other misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been preju-
diced.
(4) where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly
executed them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the
subject matter submitted was not made.
Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(1)-(4) (2000). For the tension aris-
ing in the judicial interpretation of the "manifest disregard" non-statutory
ground for setting aside awards, see, e.g., George Watts & Son, Inc. v. Tiffany
& Co., 248 F.3d 577, 581 (7th Cir. 2001) ("[Tlhe 'manifest disregard' principle
is limited to two possibilities; an arbitral order requiring the parties to vio-
late the law.., and an arbitral order that does not adhere to the legal princi-
ples specified by contract, and hence unenforceable under [section]
(10)(a)(4).") (citing Eastern Associated Coal Corp. v. United Mine Workers of
America, 531 U.S. 57, 62 (2000)). Cf Halligan v. Piper Jaffrey, Inc., 148 F.3d
197, 204 (2d Cir. 1998) ("[Wlhere a reviewing court is inclined to find that
arbitrators manifestly disregarded the law or the evidence and that an ex-
planation, if given, would have strained credulity, the absence of explanation
may reinforce the reviewing court's confidence that the arbitrators engaged
in manifest disregard."). As discussed previously, following reparations pro-
ceedings in commodity cases, appeals are taken to a panel of CFTC bommis-
sioners and then to a federal circuit court of appeals.
52. See supra notes 43-45.
53. CEA, 7 U.S.C. § 25(c) (2000).
54. The affirmative defense of the statute of limitations, governed by a
number of sections in the securities laws, including section 13 of the 1933 Act
and sections 9(e), 19(c) and 29(b) of the 1934 Act, is too broad a topic for dis-
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ability to bring claims in SRO arbitration under the six year
"eligibility" rule at the NYSE and the NASD, which, under the
Uniform Code, "does not extend applicable statutes of limita-
tion.""5 The NFA has a meager two year timeliness rule, which
tracks the two year statute of limitations under the CEA.56 The
shorter two year NFA rule has the potential to create a serious
conflict when state or federal statutory and common law
claims of fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, breach of contract and
others have longer statutes of limitations.
cussion here. It is important to note, however, that in 1991, the Supreme
Court eliminated some of the complexity by holding that state borrowing
provisions, which vary widely across the fifty plus U.S. jurisdictions, would
no longer provide the basis for calculating statutes of limitations under the
1934 Act. See Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501
U.S. 350 (1991). See generally ESTATE OF Louis Loss & JOEL SELIGMAN,
FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 1261-74 (4th ed. 2001).
55. The Resolution of Securities Disputes, supra note 11, at 324. NYSE
Rule 603 also states:
No dispute, claim or controversy shall be eligible for submission to
arbitration under this Code where six (6) years shall have elapsed
from the occurrence or event giving rise to the act or the dispute,
claim or controversy. This section shall not extend applicable stat-
utes of limitations, nor shall it apply to any case which is directed to
arbitration by a court of competent jurisdiction.
N.Y. STOCK EXCH. R. 603, 2 N.Y. Stock Exch. Guide (CCH) T 2603. The
NASD-DR rule states essentially the same thing. NASD-DR
ARBITRATION CODE, § 10304.
56. NFA CODE OF ARBITRATION, T 6035, §5 & 6041, § 6(c). Section 5
states:
No Demand for Arbitration may be arbitrated under this Code
unless a Demand or notice of intent to arbitrate . . . is received by
NFA within two years from the date when the party filing the De-
mand for Arbitration knew or should have known of the act or trans-
action that is the subject of the controversy. . . . If, in the course of
any arbitration, the Panel determines that the requirements of this
section have not been met as to a particular claim, the Panel shall
thereupon terminate the arbitration of the claim without decision or
award.
Id. 6035, § 5. Section 6(c) provides: "NFA shall reject any claim that is not
timely filed, or for which the appropriate fee has not been paid." Id. T1 6041, §
6(c). The CEA provides: "Any such action shall be brought not later than two
years after the date the cause of action arises." 7 U.S.C. § 25(c).
57. If a claim which may have already been accepted for adjudication by
the NFA is found in the course of an arbitration to be ineligible ab initio un-
462 [Vol. XXVII:2
INTL INVESTOR REMEDIES
B. The Adversarial Nature of the Arbitration Procedure:
Affirmative Defenses and Counterclaims
Not unlike litigation in general, arbitration claimants in se-
curities and commodities disputes frequently grapple with
novel issues and aggressive defense tactics. This is particularly
evident in the securities context, in which an adverse award
with written findings must be reported and usually ends up
disclosed in the individual securities broker's Form U-4 or U-558
and Central Registration Depository ("CRD") reports.59
der the NFA two-year rule, the panel of arbitrators has the authority to ter-
minate that claim "without decision or award." NFA CODE OF ARBITRATION,
6035, § 5. Hypothetically, a claimant at the NFA can thus be placed ih the
untenable position (and the expense) of prosecuting a claim that was initially
accepted for adjudication by the forum, which may later be determined to be
ineligible under the short two-year rule. Thus, diligence in timely filing
claims is absolutely necessary. Some courts have determined that eligibility
rules, as opposed to timeliness considerations, are not statutes of limitations,
and issues arising under these time bars are matters for the courts, not the
arbitrators, to decide. See, e.g., Edward D. Jones & Co. v. Sorrells, 957 F.2d
509, 512-13 (7th Cir. 1992).
"A contrary line of authority leaves it to the arbitrators to deal with
the six-year limitation period" generally regarding the limitation as proce-
dural and a matter to be decided by the arbitrators. 4 BROMBERG &
LOWENFELS, supra note 49, § 16.01(800). In New York, issues of timeliness,
whether viewed as an eligibility rule or as a procedural statute of limitations,
are in the province of the arbitrators and not the courts. See Smith Barney
Shearson Inc. v. Sacharow, 689 N.E.2d 884, (N.Y. 1997); PaineWebber, Inc. v.
Bybyk, 81 F.3d 1193, 1199 (2d Cir. 1996). As a result of an apparent conflict
in the decisional law among the U.S. federal circuit courts concerning the
complex issue of whether arbitrability matters are best decided by the courts
or the arbitrators, the Supreme Court recently agreed to resolve the issue.
See Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Howsam, 261 F.3d 956 (10th Cir. 2001),
cert. granted, 70 U.S.L.W. 3385, 3530, 3533 (U.S. Feb. 25, 2002) (No. 01-800).
58. The U-4 is the form used for the required NASD registration of indi-
viduals associated with a brokerage firm, which itself must register with the
NASD using registration Form BD. These forms also serve as the application
for registration with the SEC. Exchange Act Release No. 31,660, [1992-1993
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 85,101 (Dec. 29, 1992). The
Form U-5 is filed upon termination of registration. See NAT'L ASS'N SEC.
DEALERS, NASD MANuAL & NOTICE TO MEMBERS §§ 3070-80 (2001), available
at http'//www.nasdr.com (last visited Mar. 6, 2002) [hereinafter NASD
MAmuAL AND NOTICE].
59. The CRD report is a publicly available filing maintained by the NASD
which, among other things, lists a history of prior customer complaints
against individual account executive registrants and broker-dealers. It is a
highly useful tool for the investigation of the broker who is the subject of a
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Arbitration of these customer disputes, especially in large
and complex cases, more nearly resembles court litigation than
the simplified procedure that proponents of compulsory arbi-
tration envisioned in the pre-McMahon era-a trend that is
mirrored in international commercial arbitration." In securi-
ties and commodity futures arbitrations, a claimant is likely to
encounter the gamut of both affirmative defenses and preemp-
tively asserted or baseless counterclaims, which often attempt
to portray the investor as the culprit instead of as the victim.
Such tactics, if played out in a U.S. court, might be subject to
statutory sanctions. Examples include the assertion of ground-
less racketeering counterclaims,61 a commonly asserted defense
that tax motivated trading caused the customer's losses, and
even the dubious defense of a major FCM alleging that a Euro-
pean customer, with no prior investment experience, somehow
customer claim. NASD Regulation, Inc., in its BROKER/DEALER FIRM USER'S
MANUAL, defines the CRD report system as:
[D]eveloped jointly by the [NASD] and the North American Securi-
ties Administrators Association .... CRD was first launched in 1981
to centralize the registration process for the securities industry....
CRD made it possible to complete and send one application for an
individual to be registered in all jurisdictions.... Over the past two
(2) decades, the system has been expanded and modified extensively
to meet the evolving needs of the NASD's constituencies. CRD cur-
rently maintains this information for more than half a million regis-
tered securities employees of member firms.
NASD REGULATION, BROKER/DEALER FIRM USER'S MANUAL 2 (2002), available
at http://www.nasdr.comlwebcrd-manual.asp (last visited Mar. 5, 2002). For
publicly available information about NASD member firms and their associ-
ated persons, see NASD Regulation, NASD Regulation Public Disclosure
Program, at http://www.nasdr.com/2001.asp (last visited Mar. 5, 2002).
60. See generally Christopher R. Drahozal, Commercial Norms, Commer-
cial Codes, and International Commercial Arbitration, 33 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 79, 96 (2000) ("Procedurally, international commercial arbitra-
tion is becoming more and more like public court litigation, particularly pub-
lic court litigation as practiced in the United States.").
61. Note that securities fraud allegations based on predicate acts of mail
and wire fraud under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343, respectively, may no longer
form the basis for a RICO claim or counterclaim, pursuant to the 1995
amendment to the RICO statute. RICO, 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (2000). See also
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, sec. 107,
§ 1964(c), 109 Stat. 737, 758 ("[N]o person may rely upon any conduct that
would have been actionable as fraud in the purchase or sale of securities to
establish a violation of [RICO] section 1962.").
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"knew" of the risks because she was warned by the account ex-
ecutive when opening the account that customers who manage
their own funds only have about a 10% success rate in the fi-
nancial futures marketplace.12 It is often the case that the for-
eign investor, mystified by, and with many questions concern-
ing such tactics, should be introduced to the intricacies and
challenges involved in winning a case of financial fraud. The
following are just some of the more common defenses.
1. Defense of Contributory Negligence
The defense of contributory negligence is frequently asserted
despite the fact that, under common law, contributory or com-
parative negligence are not defenses to intentional torts such
as fraud.3  Nor may contributory or comparative negligence
arguments form a valid basis for a defense to fraud by the
party who committed the fraud in cases alleging RICO viola-
tions." In Teamsters Local 282 Pension Trust Fund v. Angelos,
a securities case, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
emphasized that it would defeat the liquidity and efficiency of
the markets to require a potential victim to take elaborate pre-
cautions against fraud, stating:
An ordinary investor is under no duty to investigate, though,
and many people invest large sums in reliance on representa-
tions made to them or on the accuracy of the market price of
the investment. The self-interest of those who seek to main-
tain reputations for honest dealing, and the legal rules
against fraud, are the primary guarantors of the accuracy of
representations in securities transactions. Investors are enti-
tled to rely on these incentives to speak the truth and to re-
cover damages from those who breach their duty to speak
trutfU]y.6
62. If accurate, such a warning would have dissuaded any sane person
from opening the account in the first place.
63. See Greycas, Inc. v. Proud, 826 F.2d 1560, 1562 (7th Cir. 1987); City of
New York v. Corwen, 565 N.Y.S.2d 457, 460 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990).
64. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of New Jersey v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 36 F.
Supp. 2d 560, 575-76 (E.D.N.Y. 1999); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, §
545A (1977) ("One who justifiably relies upon a fraudulent misrepresentation
is not barred from recovery by his contributory negligence in doing so.").
65. Teamsters Local 282 Pension Trust Fund v. Angelos, 762 F.2d 522,
526 (7th Cir. 1985).
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The same duty of care extends to commodity claimants. Un-
der the CEA, courts have routinely held that a "customer does
not have a duty to investigate the truth of the statements made
to him, but may ordinarily rely on the honesty of his account
representative's representations."66 As case law illustrates, the
assertion of this defense is far from a guarantee that the re-
spondent will prevail. Under New York law, and in most other
jurisdictions in the U.S., the basic elements necessary to sus-
tain a claim of fraud and misrepresentation sufficient to vitiate
a respondent's risk disclosures are: (1) misrepresentation of a
material fact; (2) the falsity of that misrepresentation; (3) sci-
enter, or intent to defraud; (4) reasonable reliance on the mis-
representation; and (5) damage caused by such reliance.
In Indosuez Carr Futures, Inc. v. Commodity Futures Trad-
ing Commission, an account executive was less than candid in
telling the customer that account statements should be disre-
garded because, even though they were inaccurate, that did not
matter since the customer's non-discretionary account was
hedged." The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit found
that the customer's reliance was justifiable, since the "misrep-
resentations extended to the validity of the documents them-
selves." 9 In Commodity Futures Trading Commission v.
Rosenberg, a broker's misrepresentations in reporting errone-
ous account balances and unlawful, unauthorized trading activ-
ity, for which the FCM was held vicariously liable, were
deemed to "constitute information that a reasonable investor
would consider important in trading commodity futures and
options on futures," and were held to be in violation of the
66. Jakobsen v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., [1984-1986
Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) T 22,812, at 31,393 (C.F.T.C.
1985). See also In re GNP Commodities, Inc., [1992-1994 Transfer Binder]
Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) T 25,360 (C.F.T.C. 1992); Astor Chauffeured Lim-
ousine Co. v. Runnfeldt Inv. Corp., 910 F.2d 1540, 1550 (7th Cir. 1990) ("[A]
liar may not lull the victim into a false sense of security and then say that the
reliance was not justifiable.").
67. See Granite Partners, L.P. v. Bear, Stearns & Co., Inc., 58 F. Supp. 2d
228, 257 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
68. Indosuez Carr Futures, Inc. v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n,
[1992-1994 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) T 26,125, at 41,718
(7th Cir. 1994).
69. Id. at 41,723.
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CEA.7" The CFTC has opined that "U]ustiflable reliance is not
a theory of contributory negligence, but rather is concerned
with the causal connection between the misrepresentation and
complainant's loss."7' Thus, a finding of non-reliance by a cus-
tomer would necessarily imply that the customer "would have
acted no differently had he known the truth."
7 2
2. Defense of Duty to Mitigate
The CFTC has held that "the duty to mitigate does not even
arise in the context of fraudulent inducement" where there is
no awareness by the customer of the material facts, and the
broker has concealed his fraud." This recognizes the fact that
such customers are susceptible to being deceived by the false
information: "Indeed, [the customer] was the victim of a fallacy
that frequently affects the reasoning of investors-he allowed
the accidental or random success of [the broker's] initial trad-
ing to confirm the false information conveyed to him concerning
the ability of [the broker's] program to produce profit while
controlling risk."74 In this case, though the investor was the
one who was duped by false representations, the CFTC deemed
the FCM liable for its IB's duplicitous activity.75
3. Defense of Ratification
Respondents may also allege that a claimant's actions are
barred by the doctrine of ratification, and may also assert the
related doctrines of waiver and estoppel, under the theory that
the claims should fail as a matter of law because the claimant
knowingly and voluntarily assented to them after they oc-
curred. This defense is similar to that used by the defendant
in Karlen v. Ray E. Friedman & Co. Commodities, in which
70. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Rosenberg, 85 F. Supp. 2d
424, 447-48 (D.N.J. 2000) (citing Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v.
Skorupskas, 605 F. Supp. 923, 932-33 (E.D. Mich. 1985)) (finding issuance of
false monthly statements constituted fraud in violation of the CEA).
7L Jakobsen, [1984-1986 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) at
31,392.
72. Id.
73. Levine v. Refco, Inc., [1987-1990 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep.
(CCH) 24,488, at 36,116 (C.F.T.C. 1989).
74. Id.
75. Id.
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the owners of a South Dakota cattle ranch sued their Chicago
broker for unauthorized trading and churning.76 The FCM
based its defense on: (1) the plaintiffs' testimony that the bro-
ker plausibly convinced the customer, who called to object to
unauthorized trades, that everything was in order; (2) the ad-
mission that the plaintiffs received confirmation slips for all
trades and monthly activity statements; and (3) the fact that
the plaintiffs "continued to invest substantial funds into their
accounts even though [the broker] allegedly was disobeying
their directions, and they were suffering significant losses.
In Karlen, despite the alleged complacence of the plaintiffs,
who were lulled by their broker into inaction, the Court of Ap-
peals for the Eighth Circuit refused to accept the defense of
ratification on the basis of the defendant's deception.8 In af-
firming the plaintiffs' verdict below, the court squarely ad-
dressed the issue of ratification: "The question is not simply
whether Karlen assented to the trades; rather it is whether his
apparent assent was given voluntarily and intelligently with
full knowledge of the facts."79 The court emphasized the com-
plexity of the commodities markets and the confusing character
of the materials provided by the broker, in which the state-
ments sent to the plaintiffs did not include all trades and used
confusing, technical language."0
Courts have thus declined to find ratification where an agent
has acted fraudulently or in a manner designed to prevent cus-
tomers from obtaining full knowledge of the trading activity.
In another example, Drexel Burnham Lambert Inc. v. Com-
modity Futures Trading Commission, investors sued a way-
ward commodities broker for unauthorized trades."' In affirm-
ing the CFTC decision against the broker, the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia was steadfast in its support of the
unwitting customers:
76. Karlen v. Ray E. Friedman & Co. Commodities, 688 F.2d 1193 (8th
Cir. 1982).
77. Id. at 1197-98.
78. Id. at 1198.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 1198-1200.
81. Drexel Burnham Lambert Inc. v. Commodity Futures Trading
Comm'n, 850 F.2d 742 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
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Circuit courts... have also deemed knowledge of the relevant
facts and an intent to approve the unauthorized action after
its occurrence to be preconditions to ratification.
... There is no evidence that [the customers were] aware that
the checks they signed were to fund [the broker's] trading
losses rather than the Treasury bill arbitrage program they
were pursuing.82
The confirmation reports and monthly statements which
brokers usually rely upon to establish that somehow a claimant
was able to determine the status of his accounts cannot be used
for that purpose either, where a fraud has been committed
against the investor. The Karlen court is again instructive:
Karlen's inability to determine the current status of the ac-
counts from the documents sent by Friedman is understand-
able. [The broker] executed a large number of trades in a
short period of time, and Karlen had little experience in com-
modities to assist him in understanding the transactions....
Moreover, the plaintiffs were inundated with a large volume
of documents of various types that had differing purposes
which Friedman did not describe. Indeed, the documents used
technical terms that did not plainly or precisely explain to an
inexperienced or unsophisticated trader the information that
they were providing. In fact, because the year-end and
monthly activity statements sent by Friedman reported only
closed transactions, they could convey seriously inaccurate
impressions concerning the status of the accounts. For exam-
ple, as the defendant concedes, the year-end statement for
1974 actually showed a $1,000 profit, even though Karlen lost
thousands of dollars that year when all outstanding contracts
were finally closed.'
The law is also clear that "[w]hen a customer lacks the skill
or experience to interpret confirmation slips, monthly state-
ments or other such documents" the broker is liable.' As rec-
82. Id. at 750. See also Lazzaro v. Manber, 701 F. Supp. 353, 363
(E.D.N.Y. 1988) (deeming defendants' claim of ratification insufficient to dis-
miss a lOb-5 securities fraud action where investors claimed they lacked full
knowledge and were unaware of risks due to manipulations and
misrepresentations).
83. Karlen, 688 F.2d at 1200.
84. Id.
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ognized by the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in Kar-
len, as well as by other courts, the duty lies with the broker:
[C]onfirmation slips and monthly statements do not enable a
customer to determine his or her overall position or the total
amount of real profit or loss occurring, unless the customer is
sufficiently skilled to elaborate upon them to make that de-
termination .... courts have generally refused to find that
they relieve a broker of liability for its misconduct.85
4. The "Boilerplate" on the Back of a Broker's Statements, in
Confirmations, and in Customer Agreements, Do Not Give Rise
to a Valid Ratification Defense
In Karlen, the circuit court rejected a typical ratification de-
fense, based on its lengthy examination of the confirmations
and monthly statements, including the pro forma legend on
the back of the broker's documents:
Friedman confirmed each trade by mailing the plaintiffs, on
the morning after the trade, a written confirmation slip de-
scribing the type, price and quantity of the commodity traded.
In addition, each month Friedman mailed to the plaintiffs an
activity statement which reported trades executed during the
preceding month, the net profit or loss on transactions that
were closed that month, and an account balance reflecting the
closed transactions. Each monthly activity statement was ac-
companied by a document entitled "Statement of Ac-
count-Open Trades." These documents reported under the
column title "open trade equity," the profit or loss that would
have been recognized on all open contracts if they had been
closed on the final day included in the monthly statements.
The phrase "open trade equity" was not defined or explained
in the "Statement of Account-Open Trades" document. Fi-
nally, Friedman, from time to time, mailed documents enti-
tled "Statement of Account-Purchase and Sale." Although the
purpose of these forms was not described in the record, they
were apparently sent when the plaintiffs either deposited
funds or closed out their position in any futures contract. All
of the documents mailed by the defendant included the name,
address and telephone number of Friedman, and contained
85. Id. (citations omitted).
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the legend: "NOTE: PLEASE REPORT ANY DIFFERENCES
IMMEDIATELY." 6
Numerous other cases have also held that the exculpatory ef-
fect of a pro forma risk disclosure statement will be vitiated
where the risks of trading are undisclosed or misrepresented.'
In Reed v. Sage Group, Inc., the CFTC held that standard risk
disclosures are a mere formality, and that boilerplate risk dis-
closure cannot cure false information and misrepresentations.88
Depending on the relationship between the customer and bro-
ker, such as cases in which accounts are discretionary, fiduci-
ary obligations may be viewed as more expansive, obligating
the broker to disclose more than what appears in the standard
risk disclosure statement. In Hannay v. First Commodity
Corp., the CFTC held that risk disclosures are not dispositive
and do not vitiate misrepresentations: "We repeatedly have
held that conduct can vitiate the effect of the risk disclosure
statement mandated by our rules."89
5. Additional Considerations Regarding the Arbitration
Process
There are a few other important issues that should be of in-
terest to the international claimant. Securities and commodity
futures cases often arise from dealing with SRO member firms
that have overseas offices, where international customers may
be more conversant than U.S. citizens with financial futures,
different currencies and exchange rates. Consistent with the
case law cited previously, this does not permit the inference
86. Id. at n.7.
87. See, e.g., Oram v. Nat'l Monetary Fund, [1986-1987 Transfer Binder]
Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 23,670 (C.F.T.C. 1987) (risk disclosure not
dispositive of reliance where misrepresentations were claimed); Hannay v.
First Commodity Corp., [1987-1990 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep.
(CCH) 23,936 (C.F.T.C. 1987) (claims of profitability vitiate effect of risk
disclosure statement); Miller v. First Commodity Corp., [1986-1987 Trans-
fer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 23,215, at 32,586 (C.F.T.C. 1986)
(Exaggerated predictions of "virtually unattainable rate of return" are not
negated by risk disclosure statement.).
88. Reed v. Sage Group, Inc., [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L.
Rep. (CCH) 23,943, at 34,304 (C.F.T.C. 1987).
89. Hannay, [1987-1990 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) at
34,282.
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that non-U.S. citizens are sophisticated investors solely on the
basis of their familiarity with currency exchange or their con-
duct of transnational business. Indeed, broker conduct at in-
ternational branch offices of U.S. broker-dealers can suffer
from poor supervision and, as a consequence, brokers at these
branches may be more inclined to dispense with following the
firm's policies, rules and regulations, even though they are still
subject to U.S. law and exchange rules and regulations.
Claimant's counsel usually require expert assistance to un-
derstand the intricacies of the markets and how particular
products work, and to assist in prosecuting cases either in arbi-
tration, reparations proceedings or in court. More than one
expert may be necessary to testify for the claimant in the larger
damage case in which, aside from requiring expert testimony
on damage theories and calculations, there are back office and
supervisory issues, and specific defenses that call for the ex-
perience and knowledge of qualified experts who have practiced
in the field.
In the event that claimant's counsel deems it necessary to
pursue the testimony of former employees of the brokerage
firm, there may be some obstacles to obtaining the presence of
witnesses domiciled outside the venue of the arbitration forum
or outside the U.S.90 However, as current account executives
and supervisors of foreign branch offices are presumptively reg-
istered individuals at the NYSE, NASD, or both, they are re-
quired by the forum to appear as a consequence of their regis-
tration status.9' If such individuals are sued personally, juris-
diction usually attaches even though they may have left the
industry for several years. The same rule applies with respect
to CFTC and NFA registrants.92 Similarly, if witnesses are still
employed by the firm being sued, even if the witnesses are not
registered, they will have to abide by a request from the arbi-
tration panel to appear and testify. Resort should be made to
the rules of the forum in which the case is pending and the ap-
90. See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 45; 28 U.S.C. § 1783 (2000) (covering
service of subpoenas directed to a witness present in the U.S. or in a foreign
country, who is a national or resident of the U.S., respectively).
91. See sources and text cited supra note 12.
92. See NFA CODE OF ARBITRATION TI 6017.1(a)(1)(i). On retention of juris-
diction, see, e.g., NASD MANUAL AND NOTICE, supra note 58, art. III, § 6, art.
IV, § 4 & art. V, § 4.
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propriate jurisdiction from which subpoenas can be issued in
order to have the ability to call all the important witnesses to
testify.
93
Arbitration is a private matter. As opposed to court proceed-
ings, arbitration cases are held behind closed doors and are not
open to the public. Because of the private nature of the proc-
ess, confidentiality agreements are commonplace with respect
to information and documents exchanged by the parties and
exhibits entered into evidence at the hearings. When cases are
settled prior to an award being rendered by the arbitration
panel, the settlements usually contain confidentiality provi-
sions. Arbitration awards, however, are made publicly avail-
able by the NASD-DR, NYSE and NFA.94
Smaller cases can usually be arbitrated in several days, but
the large and complex cases take many days, if not months, to
hear. It is not unusual for cases of this genre to stretch out for
a period of two to three years, in part because arbitrators have
other pursuits, but, unlike judges, they do not sit on a case
from day to day until concluded, and may only set aside two or
three days a month to conduct hearings. Likewise, the attor-
neys for the parties may have other trial commitments that
make adjournments and delays inevitable.
In almost all cases, preliminary hearings, also known as "ini-
tial pre-hearing conferences," are advisable so that the arbitra-
tors can resolve discovery disputes between the parties and
other pre-trial matters.95 But, discovery in arbitration is rela-
tively limited compared with discovery obtainable in a court
proceeding, especially when arbitrators are inclined to inter-
pret requests narrowly; however, counsel usually can prevail
by drafting comprehensive demands and requesting rulings
93. See FED. R. Civ. P. 45; 28 U.S.C. § 1783.
94. NASD-DR awards are available online on its website,
http'//www.nasdadr.com, and are required to be made publicly available. See
NASD-DR ARBITRATION CODE, R. 10330(f). NYSE awards are accessible
online at http'//www.nyse.com/arbitration/decisions. The NFA provides sum-
mary awards online at http'//www.nfa.futures.orgbasic (access requires
knowledge of the name of the broker or case identification number). Most are
available through Securities Arbitration Commentator, Inc., at
http'//www.sacarbitration.com.
95. See NASD-DR ARBITRATION CODE, R. 10321(d)(1); N.Y. STOCK EXCH. R.
619(d)(1), 2 N.Y. Stock Exch. Guide (CCH) 2619.
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when those demands are unfulfilled. In court, each party can
take pre-trial depositions, proceedings in which statements
from witnesses and parties are taken under oath and docu-
ments are produced. Non-party witnesses are also subject to
depositions. Deposition discovery not only lengthens the time
period of court litigation but also adds to the cost of the pro-
ceedings. These are two fundamental reasons why, except un-
der extraordinary circumstances, depositions are usually not
permitted in arbitration.
The arbitrators at the SROs, by regulation, must render an
award within thirty days of the close of the proceedings and
record, unless otherwise provided.96 An additional advantage of
SRO arbitration is that members must pay arbitration awards
promptly or be subject to regulatory sanction and possible sus-
pension of their licenses to operate.97
VI. CONCLUSION
Many international investors have an opportunity to obtain
damage awards in the U.S. either through cases brought in
96. See NASD-DR ARBITRATION CODE, R. 10330(h); NASD MANUAL &
NOTICE, supra note 58, art. VII, § 3; N.Y. STOCK EXCH. R. 627(d), 2 N.Y. Stock
Exch. Guide (CCH) 2627; NFA CODE OF ARBITRATION, T 6059.7(g), § 10.
97. See NASD-DR ARBITRATION CODE, R. 10330(h); NASD MANUAL &
NOTICE, supra note 58, art. VI, § 3; N.Y. STOCK EXCH. R. 627(g), 2 N.Y. Stock
Exch. Guide (CCH) T1 2627; NFA CODE OF ARBITRATION, I 6059.7(g), § 10.
While motions (or petitions) to vacate arbitration awards are rarely granted,
the NASD-DR has promulgated regulations governing the requirement that
awards be paid to the customer within thirty days following the granting of a
motion (or petition) to affirm the award in court. The relevant section provid-
ing for sanctions for noncompliance states:
The NASD after 15 days notice in writing, may suspend or cancel the
membership of any member or the registration of any person in ar-
rears in the payment of any fees, dues, assessments, or other charges
or for failure to furnish any information or reports requested pursu-
ant to Section 2, or for failure to comply with an award of arbitrators
properly rendered pursuant to the Rules of the Association, where a
timely motion to vacate or modify such award has not been made
pursuant to applicable law or where such a motion has been denied,
or for failure to comply with a written and executed settlement
agreement obtained in connection with an arbitration or mediation
submitted for disposition pursuant to the Rules of the Association.
NASD MANUAL AND NOTICE, supra note 58, art. VI, § 3. See also sources
and text cited supra note 51.
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arbitration, court or reparations proceedings. For any ag-
grieved investor, it is advisable to investigate claims thor-
oughly prior to initiating proceedings, since a great deal of time
and expense can be expended before and at the hearings, and it
is essential to explore whether one has a solid case before such
a commitment is made. Although the rights and remedies of
investors are primarily governed by statute and within the cus-
tomer agreement, the foreign branch offices of U.S. broker-
dealers and FCMs are subject to arbitration procedures based
upon the membership of those firms at SROs, such as the
NYSE, NASD-DR and the NFA. In all cases, individuals and
companies who have been unfairly treated should consult pro-
fessionals who are knowledgeable in this area for a review of
their rights and remedies.

